on security before disarmament, negotiations during the first five years of the League concentrated onattemptsto strengthen theLeague's apparatus for preventing war 2 . Articles 10 through 18 of the Covenant described the process by which members agreed to forego war in favor of peaceful settlement of disputes by the League Council. The Council was the key to the League's success in avoiding any outbreak of hostilities among its members. Its ability to carry out this function ultimately rested on unanimity, as described in Article 15, paragraphs 6 and 7. Indeed, action by the Council during the early years of the League heightened concern for the effective application of the Covenant in such diverse matters as Eupen-Malmedy, the Aaland Islands question, the Vilna dispute, the Albanian frontier, the Corfu Incident and the GrecoBulgarian frontier incident. Due to the central role of the Council in the League's process for dealing with disputes, a brief glimpse at the Council's makeup is instructive, for later attempts to provide security by strengthening the League's mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes would naturally be grounded on the ability of the Council to fulfill its vital role 3 .
Until German entry, the composition of the Council had remained remarkably stable. The permanent membership remained constant: England, France, Italy, and Japan. Moreover, although the length of a non-permanent term was three years, the nonpermanent membership had remained constant since 1920: Belgium, Spain, Brazil, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Uruguay. Among the non-permanent members various blocs were represented: the Allies, former neutral states, and the American hemisphere. The German demand for a permanent seat not only caused the delay of her entry but also necessitated an overhaul of the Council. Membership was thus enlarged to accommodate Germany and other blocs considered essential by the Allies. Total membership rose from ten to fourteen. Accordingly, provisions were made for members from Asia and the Little Entente. In addition, a compromise was struck which granted Poland the intermediate status of "semi-permanence" with a renewable seat. But the expansion brought with it seven new members in 1926, including Germany. Between 1926 and 1933 no less than twenty-five nations held non-permanent or semi-permanent seats. This instability, in part the result of the 1926 reform compromise, can also be attributed in some degree to the German policy of keeping the Council in a controlled state of flux 4 .
On the eve of German entry Bernhard v. Bülow, the Head of the Wilhelmstrasse's League section, expounded the principle which was to guide German Council policy for the duration of her membership. "In general", he said, "it is the German position that the non-permanent section of the Council be subject to the most frequent changes possible . . . Furthermore, it is in our interest that our position as permanent Council member be strengthened by such a frequent rotation of the non-permanent seats". This principle governed the Council in general. Inasmuch as new members of the Council would have to be chosen each year, Berlin developed a corollary pertaining to individual members. While the composition of the non-permanent sector of the Council was obviously of secondary importance to the permanent sector, it was in Germany's favor to promote as balanced a makeup as possible. Whenever possible, then, Germany would vote for her former Central Power allies or former neutrals. The record of membership in the Council shows that from 1926 to 1933, of the twenty-five non-permanent members, fifteen were former neutrals or Central Power allies, while ten were former Allied Powers. If the permanent seats are added to the total, the balance becomes more even: sixteen formerly neutral or Central Power nations and fourteen former Allied nations 5 . The result of the German policy was twofold. The Council became less stable and more evenly balanced. For a time this suited the broadly conceived aims of German League policy. Eventually, however, the Germans found their efforts to render the Council less effective at cross-purposes with other more limited aspects of their League policy. As we shall see, for example, a swollen and less effective Council could hardly fulfill the central role assigned it in the German security proposals of [1928] [1929] . The way is open, then, for speculation as to the sincerity of any German security proposal which turned on the unanimous decision of the Council. Even with Council unanimity, however, the Covenant did not form an air-tight barrier against aggression, but rather was riven by "gaps" or "holes". In fact, there were nine separate instances described by the Covenant in which force was a legally accepted alternative. Perhaps the most celebrated loophole was Article 12, section 1, which bound the members to submit "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture . . . either to arbitration or judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council . . ." But having thus complied, the states were still permitted the alternative of force, for they agreed "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators of the judicial decision or the report by the Council". The three-month cooling-off period was specifically designed to avoid the hasty and uncontrolled drift toward war experienced by the European powers in July 1914 6 .
Early efforts to fill these gaps ended in failure. At the behest of the First Assembly a Temporary Mixed Commission was created to plan for the execution of the Disarmament obligations described in Article 8 of the Covenant. But little progress was made until, in 1922, France succeeded in passing in the Assembly a resolution which instructed the Mixed Commission to pursue the question of mutual assistance pacts among League members as a means to augment the Covenant. The commission was charged with drawing up a draft treaty based on the idea that disarmament and increased security guarantees were interdependent. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was presented in 1923,but was not acceptable to a number of members, most notably Great Britain 7 . The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance had emphasized sanctions as a deterrent to aggression. Such a deterrent, its supporters hoped, would provide a sufficient measure of security. Gradually, however, the idea of security through added sanctions lost much of its attraction. Fresh efforts were launched to determine if the Draft Treaty could accommodate arbitration as well as sanctions. In September 1924, the Mixed Commission presented to the Assembly the revised draft, known as the Geneva Protocol. Again the draft failed to meet with British approval, and this time London's objections were echoed by those of Ottowa, Canberra and Wellington. The failure of the Geneva Protocol in October 1924 was a convincing sign that much additional work remained before the questions of disarmament and security could be sorted out, if indeed they could. In the absence of agreement on a general security pact, western energies turned to more limited proposals. These efforts bore fruit at Locarno in October 1925. Simultaneously, the League returned to the knot of disarmament and security. In September 1925, the Assembly called upon the Council "to make a preparatory study with a view to a conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security. . ., the said conference may be summoned and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realized". The Assembly's resolution again subordinated disarmament to security, in keeping with the French insistence on " first security, then disarmament". But it reiterated the League's determination to find a general solution to the disarmament-security question 8 . The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference convened in May 1926. Shaken by her declining birth-rate and projections of increased German industrial capacity, France hoped to limit not only Germany's present military establishment but her potential to wage war in the future. At the same time, Paris sought to enshrine the existing military status quo as the basis for security. To Berlin this meant the perpetuation of French military superiority and with it continued French political domination. The Germans, on the other hand, approached the problem from precisely the opposite quarter, pressing for immediate consideration of disarmament, from which they felt security would follow as a matter of course 9 . But the Wilhelmstrasse was beset with indecision. It was generally agreed that equality of armaments should be Germany's goal. But differences over intermediate policy had still not been resolved by the opening of the commission in May. The German delegation actually departed for the talks without formal instructions, in part due the haste with which they left Berlin, in part due to the lack of focus in German disarmament policy. The Wilhelmstrasse was divided between those who optimistically believed that Germany could eventually bring the Allies to disarm to her level and those who were openly skeptical of German prospects for securing armament equality through a disarmament conference. During its first year, the Preparatory Commission, waist deep in the technical morass oipotentiel de guerre and trained reserves, bore out the dark predictions of the skeptics. In April 1927, as Bülow looked back on the commission's deliberations, he concluded that the best chance for armament reduction lay outside the League in agreements between the concerned parties themselves. To Bülow, the Washington Naval Conference represented the best model for such agreement. To date, German participation in the Preparatory Commission had served only as an opportunity to point up the disparity between Allied promises and action 10 . After a year of negotiations it appeared that differences between France and Germany over what actually constituted disarmament and security might stall the commission indefinitely. But by the early fall of 1927, several factors had combined to push matters off dead center. For French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, the failure of a Polishsponsored non-aggression pact in the 1927 Assembly put an end to any thought of an early extension of Locarno to include Eastern Europe. Although he could not adhere to the Polish non-aggression proposal, the German Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann, immediately counteracted any impression that Germany was pursuing an obstructionist line. Instead, he nimbly moved to sign the Optional Clauses of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, thereby pledging to submit all legal disputes to binding arbitration by the Court. Assured by legal experts that "the immediate practical significance would be limited, but the propaganda value of Germany's signature would be that much greater", Stresemann achieved a bloodless victory by securing Germany's signature as the first Great Power to adhere to the clauses 11 .
Stresemann's move, however, was motivated not only by a desire to outmaneuver the French, but also by the need to maintain Germany's image as bündnisfähig. There was growing concern in Berlin that the advantage which Germany had so skillfully wrested at Locarno was in jeopardy. Annex F of the Locarno agreements, that clause which exempted Germany from participation in League sanctions under Article 16, had come under serious criticism by certain secondary powers, notably Finland and Persia. The fact that the Wilhelmstrasse hoped to use Article 16 as a means to secure armament equality emerges from the German documents immediately following entry; as long as she remained disarmed, moreover, Germany could refuse to participate in Article 16. According to Berlin, a broadening of Article 16, such as Finland now suggested, to assist more effectively the victim(s) of aggression could only come about if a general parity of armaments reigned in Europe. The Finnish proposal alone was enough to cause concern in Berlin. But the fact that Finland, which had expressed no desire to be Attached to this would be the Optional Clauses. The entire package would become part of a League process for obligatory mediation. It would be necessary, however, to counter the French tendency to press for additional guarantees against aggression, which would take the form of bilateral treaties and an expansion of the Covenant. In this case, the best response would be to call for an expansion of the Council's power to deal with a threat of war, as outlined in Article 11. A system of binding agreements to follow the Council's recommendations would prevent an outbreak of hostilities. Restraints could be applied if needed: the cessation of troop movements or the creation of neutral zones 17 .
At the heart of both the arbitration and mediation proposals was Germany's belief in her natural right to secure negotiated adjustments in the treaty settlement. The Wilhelmstrasse was secure in the knowledge that ample diplomatic precedent existed for such revision. From the moment of the German signature to the Treaty of Versailles revision of that hated act had been the uppermost thought in the German mind; Germany could never join in a security pact which offered no relief from what she saw to be French domination. But evidence exists, however, to suggest that for a time Germany was not only willing to explore the League as a means to security but prepared to contribute constructively to its transformation. As we shall see, though, German security proposals soon came into serious conflict with other elements of German League policy.
The Germans were by no means the only diplomats immersed in considerations of security during December 1927. The committee had named three rapporteurs to whom the committee participants would make recommendations in early January. The rapporteurs, who were to meet in Prague and subsequently submit their own recommendations to the Secretary General, Sir Eric Drummond, rescheduled their meeting for the end of January to give one another and the various countries more time to assemble their proposals. At first the Wilhelmstrasse was reluctant to submit a statement to the rapporteurs, but at the urging of German officials in the Secretariat, Stresemann agreed to submit a German paper of some kind. The deadline for reports was 15 January, but Germany secured an extension. The German statement, inoffensively entitled "Remarks by the German Government to the Program of the Security Committee", was sent to Prague on 26 January 18 .
The German remarks were brief and to the point. They placed the German attitude toward security within a political context. They stressed that Germany would not support her present territorial stabilization or the treaties which governed the political makeup of Europe without providing for a means to change them. The paper stressed the need for political change on the one hand and more comprehensive means to prevent war on the other. The purpose of the German remarks was purely tactical. As Bü-low later explained, Berlin had to make sure that the field was not left entirely to the enemy. As such, the language of the remarks was so cautious as to cause no alarm. The most important fact was that the statement set the tone for specific proposals. These would be submitted to the committee later in the spring 19 . The Wilhelmstrasse had not fully consolidated its security position; at the same time it preferred to wait for concrete proposals by the committee before submitting its own. In that way Berlin's hand would be strengthened. A German response would not only contain positive suggestions for security but would also serve as a rebuttal to the anticipated French efforts to maintain the status quo. As it happened, the committee made a startling decision. It called for several treaties, which together would form a comprehensive security package. The treaties were divided into three groups: one group of three treaties would deal with the peaceful resolution of disputes, ranging from obligatory arbitration to mediation. A second group of two agreements was to deal with security in a narrower sense, that is, the abstention from aggression and support for the victim(s) of aggression. Both of these groups were to be multilateral in nature. The third section called for a bilateral agreement enjoining abstention from war and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Once finalized, these "Model Treaties" were to be offered by the League as its security recommendations. The Germans expressed their considerable satisfaction with this development, and not without good cause. At no time was the expansion of sanctions mentioned. On the contrary, agreement prevailed that Article 16 was not the answer. Most satisfying was the fact that in none of the draft conventions was there either guarantee for, or even mention of, the maintenance of the territorial status quo 20 . While the Wilhelmstrasse played up the fact that the treaties did not insure the status quo, its attention shifted away from the vital arbitration issue. The accent of the committee began to fall more heavily on the development of means to prevent the outbreak of war. This represented the tendency which prevailed throughout the interwar years to confront not the causes but rather the manifestations of disputes, and was simply another expression of the French demand for security before disarmament. To the degree that the Wilhelmstrasse now began to follow this tendency, they had fallen into a French trap. The most nettlesome aspect of the problem was who or what decided a casus foederis. The French adhered to the principle otaction isolee, which held that any League member, pending later Council action, could independently offer aid to the victim(s) of an attack which it considered aggressive. The Germans, on the other hand, preferred to give additional authority to the Council to determine which party was the aggressor. But the Germans were in a spot. In the end, the foreign minister was forced to assure the cabinet that if worse came to worst, the Wilhelmstrasse would not be bound to sign the Model Treaties. The Foreign Ministry was already preparing to retreat from a deteriorating position 21 . At the second committee session the Germans sketched out a plan for strengthening the means of preventing war. Surprisingly, it met with widespread approval, including that of France. The one major dissenting power was Britain. During the spring Berlin reworked its suggestion in preparation for the next committee session, scheduled for 27 June to 4 July. The German proposal, under the heading of "suggestions", actually posed the possibility of a seventh model treaty. The most important feature of the proposal was the prominence it gave to the Council. The Council was to be the deciding force in the event of a conflict. On the basis of a unanimous vote (with the possible exception of one or both of the conflicting parties, should they be Council members), the Council was empowered to take action. The signatories would pledge themselves to adhere to any Council decision aimed at preventing a broadening of the conflict and at reestablishing the military status quo ante 22 . The German plan, the product of a compromise with the British, was adopted by the committee at its June-July session. Entitled the "Model Treaty to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War", it formed an important adjunct to the Model Treaties. The entire package was presented to the Assembly in September 1928. The six model treaties were grouped together in what was then called the "General Act for the pacific settlement of international disputes". The German proposal was treated separately. What emerged from the tangle of treaties is noteworthy on several counts. Firstly, the Model Treaty to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War was in reality only an expression of the signatories' intent to work with the Council and pledge to adhere to Council decisions. There was no alteration of the Council's authority. Secondly, the General Act proposed a process of arbitration and conciliation which incorporated many ideas proposed by the Wilhelmstrasse. Specifically, the signatories pledged themselves to exhaust all routes of negotiation after a diplomatic breakdown: arbitral tribunal, conciliation committee, and the Hague Court. By 1931, after a number of subsequent revisions, the Model Treaty acquired several features foreseen by the Germans: demilitarized zones, demarkation lines, and mandatory troop withdrawals. It is obvious, then, that the Germans could point to the fact that their proposals did enjoy a significant degree of success in the Security Committee 23 . At the same time, however, the Model Treaty to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War held out little prospect of assuring peace. The fact that, despite the exception already noted, the treaty turned on the unanimous decision of the Council made it virtually useless. As we have seen German entry and German policy had operated to greatly expand the Council. The increased size of the Council made unanimity highly improbable. In addition, it simultaneously reduced the chance of League sanctions, a facet in perfect keeping with German policy. In the end, although she signed it, Germany never ratified the treaty. The only two signatories actually to ratify the treaty were Norway and Peru 24 .
As for the General Act, it indicated that, despite objections of some in the Wilhelmstrasse who favored mediation, Germany was willing to negotiate toward a comprehensive security system based on binding arbitration. In their final form, however, the treaties contained one especially unfortunate clause. The signatories were given the opportunity to accede with reservations of a purely individual nature to questions arising from conditions existing prior to their accession; disputes which, according to international law, were within domestic jurisdiction of the states; and finally, questions concerning "cases or clearly specified subject matters, such as territorial statutes, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories". This clause rendered the act unacceptable to Germany, since it deprived the treaties of the capacity to allow revisions of existing treaties should France or her allies raise certain reservations. The Wilhelmstrasse fell back on the Optional Clauses. What had begun as a real hope for security with revision ended, in the words of one German diplomat, as just another "instrument of the status quo" 25 . By January 1929, Billow's successor in the League section, Ernst Freiherr v. Weizsäk-ker, complained that the German disarmament position was "becoming more and more complicated". In one sense that was true: there were certainly more peripheral factors. As previously noted, the security debate had produced a welter of complex conventions. The addition of the much heralded Kellogg-Briand Pact in August 1928 simply compounded the problem. As is often the case, the simplest language gave rise to the most intricate debate. Interest in the Kellogg-Briand Pact turned on its outlawry of "aggressive war as a means of national policy". German interest was kindled by the prospect that the pact could "fill the gaps" in the Covenant. This time the gap considered most important was paragraph 7 of Article 15, which stipulated that". . . if the Council fails to reach a report [on a dispute] which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice". The Kellogg-Briand Pact, then, if correctly applied, would rule out any threat of independent intervention from France should Germany and Poland find themselves in conflict. Such intervention would be an act of "national policy" under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, not a sanction. The Wilhelmstrasse was justly confident, moreover, that the Council, having grown to fourteen strong, could never reach a unanimous decision in the case of a dispute 26 .
An attempt to bring the Kellogg-Briand Pact into harmony with the League Covenant commenced in 1929. It was never completed. But by focusing attention on Article 16, the pact emphasized once more the intimate relationship between disarmament and security. Moreover, after the two-year Security Committee hiatus, it became evident how little real progress had been made on either front. All parties began to look once more at sanctions as a possible means of assuring the peace. Although bitterly opposed to sanctions, Berlin used this issue to press for further progress in the disarmament talks. Not only in discussions over the Kellogg-Briand Pact and Article 16, but also in the negotiations concerning the Model Treaty to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War, Berlin agreed to support sanctions, even increased aid to any victim of aggression, if assistance were tied to a general convention for the reduction of armaments. Thus, it is apparent that although the sheer volume of security proposals and Preparatory Commission sessions created a complicated, even confused situation, the German disarmament and security position was reduced to a basic formula aimed at providing armament equality.
The Germans boldly, if somewhat unrealistically, joined security and disarmament together, making both dependent on German armament equality. Disarmament, Berlin had argued all along, would logically produce security. But to Berlin disarmament meant armament equality, regardless of whether such equality was the result of general disarmament to Germany's level or German rearmament to the prevailing European level. Thus, to Germany, security, as well as disarmament, meant armament equality. In addition, however, security also had a political dimension beyond the purely military; it also meant political equality, the assurance of revision. Revision was without question Germany's chief diplomatic goal. No German government would consider a security agreement binding Germany to peaceful settlement of disputes without first assuring itself that such an agreement made provision for revision of the eastern frontiers. Revision was thesine qua non without which no security pact would be acceptable to Berlin. Much public attention was drawn by the Wilhelmstrasse to its attempts to secure revision, particularly by Stresemann, who adroitly maneuvered negotiations through step-by-step revision of occupation, military control and reparations. In addition to a public posture in demand of revision, the Wilhelmstrasse also pursued a less publicized effort to turn the League itself into an instrument of revision 27 . Well before entry, however, German diplomats admitted that it would be virtually impossible to transform successfully the League into a bona fide revisionist body. Nevertheless, the Germans were satisfied that their efforts would leave the League so weakened that a stronger Germany "could then freely pursue revision without fear of League opposition. It is within this context, then, that German security negotiations must be appraised, since any security plan which rested on the League could not escape bearing the stamp of the German effort to weaken the Council 28 . Berlin had established as early as the winter of 1926-1927 that the Council's ability to act forcefully in questions of military control was doubtful. The issue of the Council's direction of the Interallied Military Control Commission in Germany served to test the German thesis. The Wilhelmstrasse confidently saw no prospect for significant Council action in matters of military control in Germany. Their confidence was born out in the St. Gotthard incident early in 192 8 29 .
It is highly instructive, therefore, to note that ultimately the German security proposal, the Model Treaty to Strengthen the Means of Preventing War, put the Council at the heart of the mediation process. This was a Council which, according to German policy, should see as frequent rotation of its non-permanent members as possible and which Berlin already knew with reasonable certainty to be incapable of unanimous action. The Germans did not have to wait long to verify the wisdom of their prediction. The Manchurian Incident and subsequent Japanese withdrawal from the League demonstrated beyond doubt the incapacity of the Council to play a forceful role in securing peace in the Far East. The Council had chosen the path of "mediation and pursuasion" rather than "arbitration and decision" 30 .
